The most important type of large shareholder across continental Europe is holding companies and industrial companies.
Surprisingly, control by banks is relatively low in continental Europe.
Apart from the UK and the Netherlands, institutional investors are relatively unimportant.
All of the above are correct.
Shareholder protection offered by the country's legal system.
Managerial compensation contracts.
The ways whereby firms can improve their corporate governance beyond their country's standards.
Improving national corporate governance regulation via codes of best practice.
No, the existing evidence is as yet inconclusive.
No, the existing evidence suggests that non-executives reduce firm performance and value.
The existing evidence suggests that non-executives increase firm value, but only if they dominate the board of directors.
None of the above.
Concentrated ownership and strong control.
Concentrated ownership and weak control.
Dispersed ownership and weak control.
Dispersed ownership and strong control.
The principal-agent problem.
The expropriation of the minority shareholders by the large, controlling shareholder.