International Wealth And Power Test 1

The political battle between nation states

The economic battle between producers and consumers

How the consequences of global economic exchange generate political winners and losers in national and international arenas

How the consequences of global political change generate new technologies

How the consequences of global economic change generate new political cultures.

The international trade system

The international monetary system

Multinational corporation

Economic development

Scientific development

The economic interests of business and workers

How the US political process transforms these interests into trade policy.

How the US policy affects business and workers in other countries

How the International Monetary Fund is likely to respond to tariffs

The role IGOs like WTO play in regulating policies governments adopt.

Liberalism school of international political economy

Conservatism school of international political economy

Mercantilist school of international political economy

Marxist school of international political economy

Realist school of international political economy

Material and ideological interests

Societal interests and national political institutions

Consumer interests and producer interests

Trade interests and monetary interests

Security interests and diplomatic interests

Who makes foreign economic policy choices in governments

How governments make foreign economic policy choices

When governments make foreign economic policy choices

Where governments make foreign economic policy choices

Why governments make foreign economic policy choices

When it passed its "corn laws" in the 1840s

When it opened its markets to imported grain

When it forced the united states to eliminate most tariffs on trade

When it negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier treaty with Germany

When it adopted the gold standard

There were significant changes in public attitudes about the government's proper economic role.

In the 19th century liberal system, governments eliminated trade barriers but made little effort to manage domestic economic activity

The Great Depression encouraged governments to promote growth and limit unemployment

The rules embodied in the Bretton Woods system provided some insulation between the domestic and international economies

The rules embodied in the Bretton Woods system provided no insulation between the domestic and the international economies

Political liberalism and nondiscrimination

Market liberalism and preferential discrimination

Market liberalism and nondiscrimination

Market conservatism and dispute settlement

Intergovernmental bargaining and dispute settlement

Excludability and non-rivalry

Non-excludability and rivalry

Undersupply and non-rivalry

Oversupply and rivalry

Non-excludability and non rivalry

The decline of developing countries as a powerful bloc within the organization, and the emergences of NGOs as a powerful force outside the organization

The emergence of developing countries as a powerful bloc within the organization, and the decline of NGOs as a powerful force outside the organization

The emergence of advanced countries as a powerful bloc within the organization, and the decline of NGOs as a powerful force outside the organization

The emergence of developing countries as a powerful bloc within the organization, and the emergence of NGOs as a powerful force outside the organization

The decline of advanced countries as a powerful bloc within the organization, and the emergence of NGOs as a powerful force outside of the organization.

Too favorable towards consumer interests

Too favorable towards producer interests

Too biased against producer interests

Too favorable towards environmental interests

Too favorable towards labor unions.

Has lowered the stakes of trade negotiations

Has made it easier to find packages acceptable to the full membership

Has reversed the apparent tendency to place business interests before consumer interests

Has made it more difficult to find packages acceptable to the full membership

Has decreased market liberalism.

Governments agreed to negotiate additional tariff reductions

Governments agreed to incorporate existing negotiations in services

Governments agreed to pursue meaningful liberalization of trade and the environment

Governments agreed to negotiate on competition and government procurement policy

Giving preferential treatment to the goods of some trading partners with whom a country has signed treaties.

Allowing the goods of all countries to be traded freely without barriers to the flow of goods.

Giving preferential treatment to the imports of goods produced in developing countries

Giving the same preferences to the imports of all goods produced by trade treaty partners

Allowing the use of primary commodities agreements to guarantee ceiling and basement prices.

Balance of Power

Tight Bipolar

Multipolar

Hegemonic

Bipolar

Because this ensure that individual compliance with established rules is guaranteed

In order to avoid punishment in the event of compliance

So that governments can disregard WTO rules with impunity

In order to authorize punishment in the event of noncompliance

In order to avoid punishment by providing an independent quasi-judicial tribunal

The factors of production are limited by a countries geographical frontiers

Any decision to use factors of production to produce one good necessarily means that these factors are not available to produce other goods

Any decision to use factors of production to produce one good doesn't necessarily mean that these factors are not available to produce other goods

The factors of production are unlimited by a country's geographical frontiers

Countries are endowed with factors of production in infinite amounts.

The cost of foregone consumption

Consumer utility preferences

Comparative advantage

The efficiency of choices made about the use of abundant resources

The cost of foregone production

Marginal rate of substitution

Income level

Diminishing marginal utility

Consumer indifference curves

Trade

Combines high barriers to their agricultural exports and high barriers to their manufactured goods imports

Combines low barriers to their agricultural exports and low barriers to their manufactured goods imports

Combines low barriers to their agricultural exports and high barriers to their manufactured goods imports

Combines high barriers to their agricultural exports and low barriers to their manufactured goods imports

Combines high barriers to their agricultural imports and low barriers to their manufactured goods exports

Governments to trust each other to reveal only information they wish to reveal

Impatient governments to accept bad deals

Patient governments to accept bad deals

Governments to force each other to reveal information they do not wish to reveal

Governments to reveal everything at the beginning of negotiations.

The no deal will ever be reached

One government may gain bargaining power if it has an attractive outside option

One government may lose bargaining power if it has an attractive outside option

One government may gain bargaining power if it doesn't have an attractive outside option

They will both lose bargaining power.

Governments can be certain that other governments will comply with the trade agreements that they conclude

Governments cannot be certain that other governments will not comply with the trade agreements they conclude

Governments can be certain that other governments will not comply with the trade agreements they conclude

Governments cannot be certain that other governments will not comply with the trade agreements that they conclude

Governments are reluctant to enter into trade agreements that are mutually beneficial

Developed countries have the same basic factor endowments

Developed countries have the same comparative advantages

Developed countries gave a lot of capital but little labor

Comparative advantage arises from differences in factor endowments

Comparative advantage arises from similarities in factor endowments

No single actor can be made better off without at the same time making another actor worse off

At least one actor can be made better off without at the same time making another actor worse off

Neither player has an incentive to change strategies unilaterally

Both players have the advantage to change strategies unilaterally

One player has the advantage to change strategies unilaterally but the other player doesn't.

Even when all countries would benefit from trade liberalization, political dynamics trap governments in a protectionist world

Even when all countries would benefit from protectionism, political dynamics trap governments in a liberalized world

Even when no countries would benefit from trade liberalization, political dynamics trap governments in a protectionist world

Even when no countries would benefit from protectionism, political dynamics trap governments in a liberalized world.

Iteration doesn't change the nature of the reward structure

Governments use reciprocity strategies to enforce pareto suboptimal outcomes

Governments care about the payoffs they will receive in future rounds of bargaining

Governments use reciprocity strategies to enforce Nash equilibrium outcomes

Reciprocity strategies don't change the nature of the reward structure

A government's trade policy objectives are not shaped by politicians' responses to interest group demands

Government's trade policy objectives are shaped by politicians' responses to interest group demands

A government's trade policy objectives are shaped by rational choices among strong economic models

Trade largely has no distributional consequences

Distributional consequences from trade only creates winners

The sector model

The liberal model

The conservative model

The factor model

The distributional model

The sector model

The distributional model

The factor model

The pluralist model

The competition model

Globalization is good

Globalization is not good

Trade policy preferences are not determined by the income consequences of trade

Trade policy preferences are determined by the income consequences of trade

Trade politics are driven by conflicts between business and labor

Producers, rather than consumers, dominate trade politics

Import-competing sectors demanding protectionism dominate trade politics

Individual consumers have a strong incentive to organize and campaign to influence trade policy

Individual consumers face a strong incentive to be a free rider

Individual consumers have few incentives to organize and campaign to influence trade policy

Lower tariffs because large groups benefit more from protectionism

Lower tariffs because small groups benefit more from protectionism

Lower tariffs than majoritarian electoral systems

Higher tariffs than majoritarian electoral systems

Higher tariffs because large groups benefit more from protectionism

It more adequately explains who will win the political battle

It gives us more guidance about how to measure the balance of power between interests

It more correctly assumes that politicians play no autonomous role in trade politics

It more adequately addresses the motivations of noneconomic actors in trade politics

It gives us more guidance about how trade shapes the fortunes of different groups in society.

National objectives that are dependent on domestic groups' self interested concerns

National objectives that are independent of domestic groups' self interested concerns

International objectives that are dependent on foreign groups' self interested concerns

International objectives that are independent of foreign groups' self interested concerns

National objectives that are dependent on foreign groups' self interested concerns.

High degree of de-centralization of authority

Low degree of coordination among state agencies

Large number of channels through which societal actors can attempt to influence policy

Small number of channels through which societal actors can attempt to influence policy

Powerful business and labor interest groups

Great Britain

France

United States

Japan

China

Provides unambiguous supports for the claim that government intervention in high technology industries can raise national income

Suggests it is easier for governments to identify which high-technology industries can raise national income because of national security interests

Provides ambiguous support for the claim that government intervention in high-technology industries can raise national income.

Is strong because it makes it easier to translate the theory's simpler conclusions into effective policies

Is more of an exploratory theory than a prescriptive theory

They used similar industrial policy tactics similar to those used by American governments in a previous era.

Of different sector advantages obtained by European domestic interest groups

Tariffs and quotas kept American firms out of the European market

Of late-mover advantages to utilize the most recent technological innovations

The US was unsuccessful of obtaining WTO sanctions against their illegal actions

Better explain national security micrefoundational reward incentives

Better establish the parameters in which policy must be made

Better explain how government intervention can improve national welfare

Better explain state autonomy in democratic political systems

Better provide a useful check on the tendency to focus exclusively on the interests of interest groups.

Export and import oriented agricultural interests

Export and import oriented manufacturing interests

Rural-based agriculture and urban-based manufacturing

Former colonial and nationalist agriculture

Former colonial agriculture and nationalist manufacturing.

The price of its imports is rising relative to the price of its exports

The price of its exports is falling relative to the price of its imports

The price of its exports is rising relative to the costs of its exports

The price of its imports is rising relative to the costs of its imports

The price of its exports is rising relative to the price of its imports

Substituting previously imported simple consumer goods with newly domestically produced ones

Substituting previously exported simple consumer goods with newly domestically produced ones

Substituting previously imported advanced consumer goods with newly domestically produced simple ones

Substituting previously exported advanced consumer goods with newly domestically produced advanced agricultural ones.

Substituting previously imported agricultural goods with newly domestically produced manufacturing ones.

In which manufactured goods industries developed in secondary ISI began to export rather than continue to produce for the domestic market

Which was adopted by most governments outside of East Asia

In which manufactured goods industries developed in easy ISI began to export rather than continue to produce for the domestic market

In which manufactured goods industries developed in the easy ISI began to be imported rather than exported into the international market

In which manufactured goods industries developed in easy ISI began to be imported rather than continue to produce for the domestic market.

The production of one good decreases demand in industries that supply components for related goods

The production of one good increases the profits in industries that supply the components for related goods.

The production of goods for export increases demand in industries that supply components for that good

The production of goods that were previously imported increases demand among consumers for that good

The production of one good increases demand in industries that supply components for that good.

International institution dedicated to eliminate protectionism in developing countries in the world trade system

International institution dedicated to promoting protectionism in developing countries in the world trade system

International institution dedicated to promoting the interests of developing countries in the world trade system

International institution dedicated to replacing colonialism in the world trade system

International institution dedicated to promoting the interests of advanced industrian countries in the world trade system

Increased control over Multinational Corporations

Easier and cheaper access to developed countries' technologies

Rescheduling payment of foreign debt

Increased foreign aid flows

Larger role in decision making process of IMF and World Bank

They created too many veto players to block change

They raised consumer expectations to unreasonable levels

They raised producer profit expectations to unreasonable levels

State owned enterprises became too corrupt to manage

Government subsidies were too popular with urban elites

Efforts by public officials to use the political system to achieve a higher-than-market return on an economic activity

Efforts by public officials to use the economic system to achieve a higher-than-market return on political activity

Efforts made by private actors to use the political system to achieve a higher-than-market return on an economic activity

Efforts by public officials to pressure producers to pay a higher-than-average taxes on an economic activity

Any corrupt practices associated with government interference in the market