Philosophy 1 Final

We distinguish an argument’s form from its content. We ask, “Does the conclusion follow from the premises and are the premises true?” If the conclusion necessarily follows, then the argument is deductive, and if it probably follows, then the argument is inductive. Most philosophical arguments are inductive. Assuming the premises are true, is the conclusion true? If the answer is yes, then the argument has valid form. If the premises are also true, then the argument is sound. Sound premises that agreeable by the audience will also be persuasive.

Idealism: a metaphysical thesis (response to skepticism of the external world) that all reality is a construct of mental phenomenon; there is no such thing as mind-independent reality (There’s no reality that exists without us perceiving it). Everything is mental. Bishop Berkley thought the physical universe is a construct of our ideas; physical objects are simply collections of ideas. “Esse est percipi”- its being consists in its being perceived. But if this is true, how can an object, such as a table, exist unperceived? Berkley’s response: God perceives all things at a time, so they exist. We don’t perceive an evil demon behind reality. This means there can’t be one creating false perceptions.

Russell on analogy (in response to skepticism of other minds): A usually causes B, and usually only A causes B. B occurred. Therefore, A also occurred. This applies to pain causing “pain-behavior” (like saying ouch). “On this ground I infer that other people’s bodies are associated with minds, which resemble mine in proportion as their bodily behavior resembles my own.” The Argument from Analogy: · Pain (in me) usually causes pain-behavior (in me), and usually only pain causes pain-behavior · Pain-behavior occurred · Therefore, pain occurred · But, I did not myself experience any pain Therefore, · Someone else experienced pain (there are other minds) The argument from analogy has been an enduringly popular response to skepticism of other minds. But how could it be legitimate to extrapolate from one single case, my own, to conclude that pain-behavior is in general caused by pain? Response: inference to the best explanation.

The Argument from Doubt: one of Descartes’ arguments for mind and body. I can doubt the existence of my body, but not the existence of myself. Therefore, they must be separate by Leibniz law: If A and B are the same objects, then they share all the same properties. Likewise, if A and B are not the same objects, then they do no share all the same properties. A property of my body is that I can doubt its existence. A property of myself is that I can’t doubt the existence of it. Therefore, they are not the same thing. This is an illegitimate use of Leibniz’s law: beliefs, doubts, justification, and knowledge. It cannot apply the law to imply that A and B are distinct entities, so the argument is fallacious.

Interactionism: the metaphysical doctrine that the mind can enter into causal interactions with the physical world. Interactionism is an enormously plausible doctrine because we tend to think of our mind as affecting our body’s actions. This allows us to talk about desires and beliefs, which are mentally driven. Almost everyone believes in interactionism. Descartes makes many connections that support interactionism. Epiphenomenalism: body affects mind, but mind does not affect body. This is unattractive because some actions cannot be thought of as driven by anything other than the mental. Occassionalism and pre-established harmony seem like desperate reactions to epiphenomenalism.

Dualism: the doctrine that thinking beings possess immaterial souls entirely distinct from their physical bodies. I am distinct from my body because there are two types of stuff, the mental and the physical. My mind is mental and unextended. My body is physical and extended. However, dualists argue that mind and body can impact one another causally. But every physical event must have a physical cause according to the laws of physics, so it seems impossible for the unextended mind to affect the physical body. It is for this reason that both mind and body affecting the body is causally overdetermined. Every movement of the body has a physical cause. But, if a given bodily movement also had a mental cause, that would be more than is necessary. So if we espouse both dualism and interactionism, then we must hold that either the mind can interfere with physical forces and violate the laws of physics, or the mind simply reinforces the physical forces impacting the body, thus entailing massive causal overdetermination. It seems we are forced to accept epiphenomenalism, the doctrine that one’s mind exerts no causal impact upon one’s body (the mind is just along for the ride).

Simple Dualist: Persons A and and Person B are numerically identical if and only if A and B share the same immaterial soul. Response: Past lives/reincarnation. Locke says that one might share the same soul as a person in the past, but can’t remember events from previous lives. Due to a lack of memory/consciousness, they can’t be the same person. Simple Material: Persons A and Person B are the numerically identical if and only if A and B share the same body. Response: Night Man/Day Man. Night Man does not remember the Day Man’s experiences and vice-versa (like Jekyll and Hyde). Two people can be distinct (different souls) and share the same body. Counter-example against both: Prince and the Cobbler (body switching). The immaterial souls stay in the same place (breaks dualist view) even though consciousness is swapped, and they have switched bodies (breaks materialist view).

· : If P, then Q. P. Therefore, Q. § Skepticism: If not P, then not Q. Not P. Therefore, not Q. § If you can’t know that things are as they seem, then you cannot have knowledge § You can’t know that things are as they seem § Therefore, you can’t have knowledge

o There is a spacious world of some sort o But reality is not what it seems because what it seems is based on our perceptions- which can deceive us o Interpretation 1. If you can’t know that you are not dreaming, then you can’t know anything about the external world on the basis of perception 2. You can’t know that your are not dreaming Therefore, 3. You can’t know anything about the external world on the basis of perception If P, then Q. P. Therefore, Q. (valid)

o 1. Perceptional error: illusions, hallucinations, etc. § Calls into question particular beliefs about my immediate surroundings o 2. The Dreaming Argument § Suggests I cannot know anything about the external world on the basis of perception o 3. The Evil Demon § Calls the very existence of an external world into question (illusions created by a powerful evil demon)

· Similar to being in the Matrix. It elicits a central theme of philosophy, appearance versus reality. Two scenarios: 1. You plug into the experience machine, and you know the whole time that you are in the experience machine. 2. You plug into the experience machine, but your memories are erased so you don’t know that you are in the experience machine. -Which would you take? -Nozick’s question: “What else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from inside?” -Nozick’s answer: “We want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them.” He thinks we care about how things really are, not just how they seem, that we care about actually making a difference. But how could it possibly matter if I were plugged into the experience machine? Isn’t my own immediate pleasure the only thing I care about (hedonism). -A crucial point: To establish that there is something bad about living in the experience machine, we don’t need to establish that plugging into the machine is never a rational decision. We only need to establish that there is something bad about being in the experience machine.

o We don’t have direct access to other peoples’ minds o Must ask others, whereas you don’t have to ask yourself o Must observe the behavior of others and infer mental experience o But couldn’t behavior be consistent with other mental states? § i.e. seeming bummed, but being happy § Does chocolate ice cream taste the same to your vanilla loving friend? · Either it tastes the same (same experience), and he just doesn’t like it · Or it tastes different (different experience), and is disgusting

1. Lies, self-deception, misunderstandings, etc. § Calls into question particular beliefs about other people’s mental states 2. Systematic deception (The Truman Show) § Suggests I cannot know anything about other people’s mental states 3. Zombies; automata § Calls the very existence of other minds into question

· Metaphysical claim (in response to skepticism of other minds) that mental states are simply behavioral dispositions o Disposition: tendency to react certain ways in certain circumstances o Behavior: purely physical, perceptually observable o A behaviorist would say that a person is in pain (“mental state x”), if and only if, he or she exhibits the right behavior o Counter examples: 1. Super Spartans, acting/lying animals 2. Some mental states are difficult or impossible to describe in terms of behavioral dispositions, e.g. belifes 3. Knowledge of one’s own behavior (Moore’s Paradox)

· Qualitative Character: many mental states feel a certain way. There is something it is like to be in pain, or to look at a bright red light. Intentionality: some mental states are about things in the world, and represent them. ex. My belief that Obama is president is about the president- it bears some relation to the guy. Beliefs and intentions exhibit intentionality, but do not have (much) qualitative character (what is it like to believe that Obama is president?). Pains and tickles have qualitative character but not (much) intentionality (pain is not about anything like beliefs might be). Perceptions and emotions usually have both.