Islington LBC v Green
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Regarding whether a capable grantor / grantee.
It was held that ‘the relationship between
landlord and tenant is not dependent on whether the lease creates an estate or
other proprietary interest which may be binding on third parties. Whether a
lease creates a proprietary interest in turn will depend on whether the
landlord has an interest out of which he has granted it’
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Lace v Chantler
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Regarding fixed term
“a term created by a leasehold must be expressed
either with certainty and specifically or by reference to something which can,
at the time when the lease takes effect, be looked at as a certain
ascertainment of what the term was meant to be”
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Prudential Assurance v London Residuary
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Periodic Tenancy
Held that all leases of land must be for a term
of a certain duration. A highway authority purchased a piece of land alongside
a highway, and leased it back to the seller, the terms of the lease stating
that it was leased to him until it was required for the purposes of widening
the road. It was held that leases must be for a certain or determinable length
of time, and thus the agreement leasing the land until it would be required for
road-building was void.
As the tenant paid rent yearly, then the lease would be
held to be a yearly one, which the new owner could lawfully terminate |
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Street v Mountford
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Landmark decision in the lease/license
distinction. S let his house to M in return for a weekly payment, in a written
agreement headed ‘License’, she accepted rules about visitors and heating. S
retained the right to enter the house to inspect it. The House of Lords held
that this was a weekly tenancy, the normal test of a tenancy is the factual
question of exclusive possession rather than the intention of the parties:
“The occupier is a licensee if the landlord provides services which require the
landlord to exercise unrestricted access to and use of the premises. If on the
other hand residential accommodation is granted for a term at a rent with
exclusive possession, the landlord providing no services or attendance, the
grant is a tenancy”
the status of an agreement depends
upon the substantive rights granted by it and not the labels used within it. |
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Antoniades v Villiers
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A ‘license agreement’ which seemed to
give the owner the right to sleep in the tiny flat with a cohabiting couple was
held to be a tenancy, the term looked as if it denied exclusive possession to
the couple but it was held to be a sham, inserted to the agreement merely to
avoid giving Rent Act protection, and therefore it had no effect |
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Abbeyfield v Woods
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The occupier of a room in an old people's home
was held to be a licensee and not a tenant. Lord Denning said “The modern cases
show that a man may be a licensee even though he has exclusive possession, even
though the word 'rent' is used, and even though the word 'tenancy' is used. The
court must look at the agreement as a whole and see whether a tenancy really
was intended. In this case there is, besides the one room, the provision of
services, meals, a resident housekeeper, and such like. The whole arrangement
was so personal in nature that the proper inference is that he was a licensee.”
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AG Securities v Vaughan
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A granted to V and his girlfriend the right to
use a flat. Each occupant signed separate but identical agreements described as
licenses, which stated that the Rent Acts did not apply, that "the
licensor is not willing to grant...exclusive possession" and that the use
of the flat was "in common with the licensor and such other licensees or
invitees as he may permit from time to time". It was held that in reality
there had been an intention to grant exclusive possession and accordingly a
tenancy had been created |
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National Car Parks v Trinity Development
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‘the court must look to the substance
and not to the form. But, it may help in determining what the substance was, to
consider whether the parties expressed themselves in a particular way. To wholly
disregard the parties choice of wording would be inconsistent with the general
principle of freedom of contract…’ |
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Ashburn v Arnold
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the statement by Lord Templeman in Street v
Mountford that the three hallmarks of a tenancy are: “exclusive possession
for a term at a rent” did not lead to the conclusion that “no rent, no lease”
necessarily followed. Therefore, there is no requirement to actually pay rent
in order for the agreement to be a lease. |
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King's Motors v Lax
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it was observed that as the rent was not agreed
and was left to be agreed, the contract is not enforceable and void for
uncertainty |
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Walsh v Lonsdale
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If the proper formalities have not been complied
with (ie. No deed or registration) then as long as there is a specifically
enforceable contract for land, the lease will be treated as equitable |
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Owen v Gadd
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Landlord covenant for quiet enjoyment
It is not necessary in order to constitute a
breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment that there should be an actual
physical irruption into or upon the premises demised on the part of the
landlord or some person authorised by him, albeit the disturbance must be of a
direct and physical character. |
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Southwark v Mills
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Landlord covenant for quiet enjoyment
A covenant for quiet enjoyment did not impose an
obligation on a landlord to rectify acts or omissions pre dating the grant of a
tenancy. A tenant took premises in
the condition in which he found them and subject to the uses which the parties
contemplated would be made of those parts retained by the landlord. |
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Chartered Trust v Davies
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Landlord covenant not to derogate from the grant
D was the lessee of one of the retail units,
having taken the lease in 1988 on the strength of the estate agent's
particulars that emphasised the superior nature of the arcade. In 1992 the
lessors let an adjacent unit to a pawnbroking business.
The lessor's inaction constituted a continuation
of the nuisance and rendered the premises materially less fit for the purpose
for which they were let. The trial judge was entitled on the evidence to find
that was a repudiation of the lease
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Harmer v Jumbil
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Landlord covenant not to derogate from the grant
The
claimant took a Lease
of land from the defendant Landlord with the express and known intention of storing
explosives on it. The landlord then started to build on neighbouring land; the
proximity of the new buildings meant that the claimants could not legally store
explosives. The court held that for the landlord to build would amount to aderogation from grant, that is, they would
have taken good money to grant a lease which would be of no value to the
lessees.
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National Carriers v Panalpina
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Tenant covenant to pay rent
Usually there is a covenant obliging
the tenant to pay rent, failure to pay rent is a breach of covenant unless
there is frustration or repudiation of the lease. If the lease is not
frustrated, even if tenant can’t use the premises, he remains liable on all the
covenants, including to pay rent. Forfeiture clauses for non-payment of rent
are usually included in leases and therefore give the landlord the right to
forfeit the lease for non-payment. |
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Governors of Rugby School v Tannahill
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Forfeiture
The defendant lessee committed a breach of her
covenant not to use the premises for illegal or immoral purposes. Notice to
quit served on her in consequence did not require her to remedy the breach nor
to make compensation in money under s. 146 of the LPA 1925:- Held: (1.) that ceasing to commit the breach was no
remedy; (2.) that the breach was not capable of remedy, and that, consequently,
omission to require it to be remedied did not invalidate the notice; and (3.)
that the notice was not invalidated by the omission to require payment of
compensation in money although the breach was incapable of remedy, because if
the landlords did not require compensation they need not ask for it.
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